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ABSTRACT
Researchers, using the survey conducted by Money Market Services,
Inc., have found that the anticipated component in the Federal Reserve's
weekly money supply announcement is negatively correlated with the post-
announcement change in market yields. We prove that eliminating a
(downward) bias in the measure of anticipated money can, in theory,
eliminate this puzzle, but that improving the efficiency of an already
unbiased measure cannot. We find, using Canadian as well as U.S.
interest rate data, that correcting the downward bias in the survey
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I.Introduction
Enrecent years, researchers have examined in detail the impact of
the Federal Reserve's weekly money supply announcement on interest rates.
(See, for example, Grossman (1981), Urich (1982), Urich and Wachtel
(1981), Roley (1983, l986a,b,c), Cornell (1983), and Roley and Walsh
(1985)). These researchers have established that both short-term and
long-term interest rates tend to rise when the change in the money supply
exceeds the change anticipated by market participants, and conversely.1
In conducting their empirical tests, researchers have relied heavily on
the survey data on the expected announced change in the money supply
compiled by Money Market Services, Inc. Indeed, the availability of
these data has served as perhaps the most important catalyst to this
research program.
There is, however, an anomalous finding in this empirical
literature. When the post-announcement change in the interest rate is
regressed on both the unanticipated and the anticipated change in the
money supply, the coefficient of the anticipated change is consistently
negative and often statistically significant. This must be seen as a
puzzle, for the following reason. The interval over which the post-
announcement change in the interest rate is calculated is very short,
typically not more than 24 hours and occasionally as short as one-and-
one-half hours.2 If the change in an interest rate is measured over a
very short interval relative to its maturity, the predictable component
in the change should be minimal, and increasingly so as the length of the
interval is reduced (Pesando (1979)). Intuitively, if one could predict
-onthe basis of known information -changesin an interest rate over so2
short an interval, arbitrage activities should quickly eliminate this
dependence and so eliminate the attendant opportunity to earn sizeable
trading profits.
The purpose of this paper is to address the puzzle posed by this
anomalous finding. There are four main tasks. First, we confirm the
existence of the puzzle, using data on Canadian as well as U.S. interest
rates. Second, we show that the estimated coefficients of the
anticipated change in the money supply imply arbitrage opportunities that
are important in an economic sense. There j a puzzle. Third, we prove
that eliminating a (downward) bias in the measure of anticipatedmoney
could, in theory, eliminate the puzzle, but that improving the efficiency
of an already unbiased measure could not. Fourth, we investigate the
extent to which eliminating the downward bias in the median response to
the survey conducted by Money Market Services, Inc. serves, in fact, to
eliminate the significance of anticipated money.
To anticipate our findings, we confirm the negative -andfrequently
significant -coefficientof anticipated money. We illustrate, using the
crucial subperiod from October 1979 to October 1982, that exploiting the
estimated relationship would have significantly improved the returns
earned by economic agents. We show that there is a downward bias in the
median response to the survey forecast, and that this bias is often
significant or marginally so. Correcting the survey measure for this
bias reduces the importance of, but does not eliminate, the significance
of anticipated money. We include a brief discussion of alternative
explanations for the puzzle, and then summarize our findings.3
II. The Impact of Anticipated Money on Interest Rates: Canadian and
U.S. Evidence
In Table 1, we present regressions of the post-announcement change
in interest rates on unanticipated and anticipated changes in themoney
supply, for U.S. and Canadian 90-day Treasury bills and for 20-year U.S.
government and Government of Canada bonds. The anticipated (percentage)
change in the money supply is calculated from the median response to the
surveys conducted by Money Market Services, Inc.
We examine the sample period from October 11, 1979 to September 5,
1985. We thus omit from consideration the period from September 1977
(the beginning of the survey) to October 1979, since the literature
suggests that anticipated money did not matter prior to this time. (See,
for example, Grossman (1981) and Roley (1983).) The window for the long-
term bonds and for U.S. Treasury bills is from 3:30 pm. on the day of
the announcement to 3:30 p.m. on the following business day; for Canadian
Treasury bills, from 3:30 p.m. on the day of the announcement to 10:30
a.m. the following business day.3 Following Roley (1986a,b,c), we look
at three subsamples, which correspond to dates of apparent shifts in the
U.S. monetary regime. These are October 1979 to October 1982, when the
Federal Reserve replaced the federal funds rate with nonborrowed reserves
as its operating instrument; October 1982 to October 1984, when the
Federal Reserve replaced nonborrowed reserves with borrowed reserves as
its operating instrument and probably de-emphasized Ml targeting; and
from February 1984, when the Federal Reserve adopted contemporaneous
reserve requirements and (probably) further de-emphasized Ml targeting,
to the end of our sample in September 1985.4
The U.S. results confirm those of prior researchers. The
coefficient of unanticipated money is always positive and significant,
while the coefficient of anticipated money is always negative and often
significant.4 The results using Canadian interest rates are similar.
There is some evidence that the Bank of Canada smoothed the response of
bill rates on announcement days, especially in the first subperiod. For
long-term bonds, the Canadian and U.S. results are remarkably similar.5
From the perspective of the "puzzle," the first subperiod, from October
1979 to October 1982, is the most troublesome. Anticipated money is
significant in explaining the post-announcement change in all interest
rates except for Canadian Treasury bills.
III. Economic Significance of the Coefficients of Anticipated Money
To illustrate that the significance of the coefficients of
anticipated money does indeed constitute a "puzzle," it is useful to
identify the profit opportunities associated with a simple trading rule.
Because the coefficients of anticipated money are the largest, we focus
below on the U.S. results for the October 1979 to October 1982 subsample.
Consider two strategies. The first, the benchmark strategy, is to
buy bills or bonds on the day of the announcement, and to sell on the
following business day. The second is to buy hills or bonds on the day
of the announcement if the expected change in the money supply is
positive, since yields will on average fall, and to close the position on
the following business day. If the expected change is negative, the
bills or bonds will he sold short and the position closed on the
following day.(We make no explicit allowance for transactions costs.5
One can, however, think of the second strategy as characterizing the
strategy of a buyer whose decision is to purchase before or after the
announcement, and a seller whose decision is to liquidate before or after
the announcement.)
If applied to Treasury bills, the benchmark strategy produces an
annualized holding-period return, averaged over the 156 observations in
the subsample, of minus 185 per cent. For this same interval, from 3:30
p.m. on the announcement day to 3:30 p.m. on the following business day,
the benchmark strategy produces a holding-period return that averages
minus 86 per cent when applied to U.S. government bonds.(These negative
returns reflect the tendency, on average, for the post-announcement
charge in interest rates to be positive during this subsample, as
evidenced by the constant terms in the regressions reported in Table 1.)
If an investor followed the second or informed strategy, exploiting the
predictive content of anticipated money, he would have earned an average
annual return of 162 per cent on Treasury bills, and 123 per cent on U.S.
government bonds. The increase in the holding-period return is
significant at the 5 per cent level for Treasury bills, and at the 1 per
cent level for the U.S. government bonds.6
We could, of course, simulate the use of the predictive content of
anticipated money in different ways. For example, the investor might
implement the informed strategy only if the absolute value of the
anticipated change in money exceeds its mean. In essence, the investor
applies a filter and only acts if the information contained in the
anticipated money change is larger than average. If this filter is
applied, then the mean return (for the 66 "active" observations) rises to6
254 per cent for Treasury bills, and to 166 per cent for long-term bonds.
In short, an investor who could postpone or accelerate a purchase,
or do likewise for a sale, could have significantly improved his returns
by acting on the information contained in the known value of anticipated
money. The fact that this information was jQfullyreflected in prices
and yields, and thus of no value in predicting subsequent changes, j a
puzzle.
IV. The Non-Rationality of the Survey Forecasts: A Clarifying Theorem
Can non-rationality of the (widely-used) median response to the
survey conducted by Money Market Services, Inc. "explain" the puzzle of
anticipated money? We prove below two important propositions: first,
eliminating a (downward) bias in the measure of anticipated money in
theory, solve the puzzle; and second, improving the efficiency of an
already unbiased measure cannot.
Let denote the change in the interest rate subsequent to the
announcement, let EM denote the anticipated change in the money supply
conditional upon all known information, and let UM denote the
corresponding measure of the unanticipated change in the money supply.
We are interested in the following model:
* * R=b +bUM +hEM +u (1) t 0it 2t t
Ourmaintained hypothesis is that positive money surprises serve to raise
interest rates (b1 >0),and that anticipated changes in the money supply
exert no impact on interest rates (b2 =0)Je thus that
LR is uncorrelated with all information known to economic agents prior7
to the announcement. This accords with the predisposition of most
observers to believe that the market will efficiently assimilate all
relevant information into the pre-announcement structure of interest
rates.
Suppose, however, that the researcher has access to a measure of
anticipated money which does fully exploit all known information and
which has a bias as shown below:
EM EM
+v (2)
If 3 >1,then the measure available to the researcher is biased




In the true model given by equation (1), the coefficient(b2) of
anticipated money is equal to zero. We prove below that the coefficient
>
c2in (3) is 0 as 1.




-Thedenominator of (4) must be positive, so that the sign of
c2
must be the same as the sign of the numerator. Further,
cov(LR,EM)
must be zero since EM is known and, by hypothesis, tR is8
uncorrelated with all known information. Thus the sign ofc2 will
reflect only the sign of the second term in the numerator.
The actual change in the money supply (EM) must, by construction,
* *
equal EM plus UM as well as EM plus UM. We can thus rearrange
(2) to obtain:
TiM=
UM+ a + (/3l)EM + Vt (5)
* *
Note that cov(UM ,EM. )mustequal zero since UMis uncorrelated with c t t
any information available to agents prior to the announcement. Thus
cov(UM,EM) equals (/3..l)var(EM).Note also that cov(R,UM)
equals cov(R,UM) since UM =UMt*+(EMEM) and (EMEM) is
uncorrelated with by hypothesis since it represents known
information. Thus, from (1), we have cov(Rt,UM) b1var(UM). These
results imply that the second term in the numerator of (4) is:
-cov(UM,EM).cov(R,UM) =(l)var(EM).b1var(UMk) (6)
Our first proposition is that
c20 as 0, which follows
immediately from (6).If, for example, the measure of anticipated money
used by the researcher is biased downward (3 > 1), then the coefficient
of anticipated money in (3) will be negative.
Our second proposition also follows immediately from (6). If the
measure of anticipated money is unbiased (= 1),then c2 0. The
degree of inefficiency of an unbiased forecast, equal to var(v) in
(2), cannot cause the coefficient of anticipated money in (3) to be
7
negative.9
These two propositions provide the following perspective on the
puzzle of anticipated money. If the measure of anticipated money used by
the researcher has a downward bias, then correcting this bias may
eliminate the negative coefficient if the true coefficient of anticipated
money is zero. However, an attempt to improve the efficiency of an
already unbiased measure, perhaps by incorporating additional information
that becomes available between the date of the forecast and the date of
the announcement, should have no such effect.
This point has not been made previously in the literature. Indeed,
it appears to be the source of some confusion. Roley (1983), for
example, adjusts the raw survey forecasts beginning with the money
announcement on February 8, 1980 to reflect the fact that the survey is
no longer taken on the day previous to the Friday announcement, but three
days before (Tuesday). Roley assumes that movements in the Treasury bill
yield over the intervening three days capture the change in the market's
expectation of the money supply announcement. He finds that replacing
the raw survey forecast with an adjusted forecast, which uses this
information, eliminates the significance of the coefficient of
anticipated money. Hem (1985) points out that Roley's correction
implicitly eliminates a downward bias in the survey forecast. Hem re-
estimates Roley's correction, no longer constraining it to eliminate
bias, and finds that the coefficient of anticipated money remains
significant.8 Hem does not appear to appreciate the precise nature of
this result. For example, he refers interchangeably (page 268) to
Roley's "implicit correction for inefficiencies in the survey forecast"
and the fact that Roley has corrected for the tendency of the survey10
forecasts "to underestimate, in absolute value, nonzero money stock
changes.
Clark, James and Phillips (1985) argue that the survey expectation
does not appear to incorporate fully the information contained in "social
security weeks." While it may be genuinely useful to incorporate this
information into the proxy for anticipated money, our result shows that
this suggestion to improve the survey forecast cannot be considered an
explanation of the puzzle.1°
V. Some Empirical Evidence
In this section, we first perform standard tests for the
unbiasedness of the median response to the survey conducted by Money
11 E Market Services, Inc. Let AMt denote the forecast change in the
money supply according to this survey, and let denote the actual
change that is subsequently announced. The standard test for
unbiasedness is an F-test of the null hypothesis 0and 1 in
the following regression:
E = + 131LM+e (7)
Our estimates of this equation, for the full sample and for each of the
subsamples, are presented in Table 2.In the subsample from February
1984 to September 1985, as well as for the full sample, there is a
significant downward bias in the forecasts. In the subsample October
1979 to October 1982, where the coefficients of anticipated money are the
largest, the median survey forecast has a downward bias, butitis not
significant.11
We utilize, for each subsample, the fitted values from the
regressions presented in Table 2 as our revised measure of anticipated
money. By construction, the bias in the survey measureof anticipated
money is thus eliminated for each subsample.
We next rerun the regressions of the post-announcement change in
interest rates on both anticipated and unanticipated money. Substituting
the revised measures of anticipated and unanticipated money will affect
only the coefficients (and the standard errors) of anticipated moneyand
the constant term.12 Thus we present, in Table 1, the estimates of
the coefficients (c) of anticipated money after we have corrected the
median response for bias. As we expect, in light of the downward bias in
the survey median for all subperiods, the t-statistics for anticipated
money decline in all of the twelve regressions. Inthe subsample
February 1984 to September 1985, where the downward bias is the
strongest, the coefficient of anticipated money ceases to be significant
in the regression for Canadian Treasury bills. For the subsample October
1979 to October 1982, the significance of anticipated money in the
regressions for U.S. Treasury bills, and for U.S. government and
Government of Canada bonds, remains, although at a somewhat reduced
level. For these regressions, the solution to the puzzle of anticipated
money must be sought elsewhere.
We can provide, however, no alternative explanation that meets with
our satisfaction. In terms of an economic explanation, we can only note
that the subperiod October 1979 to October 1982 was characterized by the
unprecedented level and volatility of interest rates, and followed an
abrupt and dramatic shift in the operating procedures ofthe Federal12
Reserve. In spite of the significant arbitrage profits to be earned from
exploiting the predictive content of anticipated money, agentsmay have
been too risk averse to act upon this information.
There exists, as well, the possibility that these resultsmay be a
statistical artifact. If we systematically delete observations from the
October 1979 to October 1982 subsample, we find that the significance of
anticipated money is extremely sensitive to four observations. If these
four observations are deleted from the regression for U.S.Treasury
bills, the t-statistic for anticipated money declines from 2.24 to
1. 36.
13
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Data on the anticipated change in the money supply compiledby Money
Market Services, Inc. have served as a catalyst to therapidly-expanding
literature on the impact of money "surprises" on financial markets.
Somewhat paradoxically, researchers have found that theanticipated
component in the Federal Reserve's weekly money supply announcement
exerts a persistently negative effect on the post-announcement change in
market yields.
In this paper, we have clarified the extent to which the non-
rationality of the (widely-used) median response to the survey may
underlie this puzzle. We prove that eliminating a (downward) bias in the
measure of anticipated money can, in theory, eliminate this puzzle, but
that improving the efficiency of an already unbiased measure cannot. We
find, using Canadian as well as U.S. interest rate data, that correcting
the downward bias in the survey measure reduces, hut does not eliminate,13
the significance of anticipated money.14
Footnotes
1. There is, however, disagreement in the interpretation to be assigned
to the market's response to the news contained in the announcement.
Cornell (1983), for example, has suggested that it may be only the
nominal interest rate that rises in response to a positive surprise,
to reflect a higher inflation premium. Urich and Wachtel (1981) and
Roley and Walsh (1985), for example, argue that it is the real
interest rate that rises in response to a positive surprise, to
reflect the anticipation that the Federal Reserve will counteract -
notaccommodate -thesurprise.
2. Roley (1983) uses the one-and-one-half hour interval (from 3:30 p.m.
to 5:00 p.m. on the day of the announcement). Urich and Wachtel
(1981) utilize a half-day interval, from the afternoon before the
announcement to the morning after.
3.For Canada, the Treasury bill data are from the Bank of Canada's
data bank or quote sheets. The data for long-term bonds are the
yields on individual and heavily-traded bonds with a maturity of
approximately 20 years (the 9 1/2's of 2001 for October 1979 to
October 1982, and the 10 1/4's of 2004 for October 1982 to September
1985), from daily quote sheets provided by R. Hannah of the
Securities Department of the Bank of Canada. For the United States,
the bond yields are for the 20-year constant maturity bond from the
Federal Reserve's H.15 release, made available to us through DRI
Canada, and the bill data are from the Bank of Canada. The source
of the money supply data is the Federal Reserves H.6 release. The
data on the anticipated change in narrowly-defined money compiled by15
Money Market Services, Inc. were made available to us through the
courtesy of Vance Roley. In our empirical work, we use the
percentage change in narrowly-defined money. To construct this
percentage change, we use the preliminary (flQ the revised) data on
the money supply.
4. The results also support the choice of subsamples. For the U.S.
Treasury bills, the test statistics for structural change in the
response to unanticipated money are significant (at least) at 10 per
cent. We use the Wald test statistic which is asymptotically
distributed as x2(l) because the standard F-test is inappropriate
in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The values of our test-
statistic are 3.67 (for the break between the first and second
subperiods) and 5.98 (for the break between the second and third).
There is, of course, abundant evidence of a structural change in
October 1979. See, for example, Loeys (1985).
5.The Bank of Canada (1980) sought, in 1980, to attenuate the response
of short-term interest rates in Canada to movements in U.S. rates,
given the increased volatility of the latter after the October 1979
shift in the monetary regime. The results in Table 1 provide
evidence of this smoothing, at the short end of the maturity
spectrum, in light of the increased volatility of interest rates on
announcement days. Any smoothing of the response of short-term
interest rates by the Bank of Canada will, of course, have
repercussions on the foreign exchange value of the Canadian dollar.
An analysis of the (perhaps) changing reaction function of the Bank
of Canada is beyond the scope of the present paper.16
6. The relevant t-statistics, with 155 degrees of freedom, are 2.32 for
Treasury bills and 3.30 for U.S. government bonds.
7. Note that var(v) does not appear explicitly in (6). We can,
however, readily rearrange (6) to obtain:
* *
2(var(EM) -var(v)).b1var(IJM) (Fl)
From (Fl), it follows explicitly thatc2 =0if fi= 1
regardless of the value of var(v).
8. For the period February 8, 1980 to October 15, 1982, Roley estimates
the following "revision" (bracketed figures are standard errors):
0.2768 +l.2Ol6(ME)+l.2624(RF-RT )+u (F2)
(0.1872) (0.1216) (0.3472) tt
whereLM is the actual change in the money supply, M1 is the
forecast change in the Tuesday survey, and RF and RTt are the
three-month bill yields on Friday and Tuesday, respectively. Roley
uses the fitted values from (F2) to proxy the market's expectation,
and finds that anticipated money no longer exerts a significant
negative impact on the post-announcement change in three-month bill
yields. Hem (1985) shows that when he reruns (F2) with the
coefficient of constrained to unity, then anticipated money
remains a significant determinant of the post-announcement change in
yields. Note, as anticipated by the theorem we derive in the text,
Roley's "correction" does involve the elimination of a downward bias
in the median response to the survey conducted by Money Market
Services, Inc.
9. Roley (1985), in his reply to Hem, raises arguments similar to the17
ones made in this paper.
10. We have assumed throughout that the coefficients a andin (2) are
constant. With time varying values of a and ,theinterpretation
of the coefficients in (3) may be sample-specific. It is difficult
to say anything about the impacts of bias and inefficiency in this
case without being very specific about the nature of the time
variation in the parameters.
11. Many researchers have examined the rationality of these forecasts.
See, for example, Grossman (1981), Hafer (1983), Urich and Wachtel
(1984), and Engel and Frankel (1984).






Using the definition of L ,wesee that the regressors in the two
equations span the same space. Therefore, elt =e2
.Also,since
the difference between (M -LM)and its orthogonal projection
onto the constant and iM is exactly (Mt -£I)
,the
coefficients and are numerically identical as are their
estimated standard errors.
13. These results are from regressions of the post-announcement change
in the interest rate on anticipated money and a constant. Note that
if the true coefficient of expected money is zero, excluding
unanticipated money from the regression is tantamount to eliminating
any bias. Belongia, Hafer and Sheehan (1986) partition the sample
1978-1983 into 6-month subsamples, and then run regressions of the18
post-announcement change in U.S. Treasury bills on both expected and
unexpected changes in money. Belongia et. find that anticipated
money is significant (and negative) at the 5 per cent level only for
the subsample corresponding to the first half of 1981. They find
that by dropping the observation for May 1, 1981 (one of the four
observations deleted after our search), the significance of
anticipated money is eliminated for this subsample. In conducting
their analysis, Belongia al. employ a variation of the
correction suggested by Roley (1983)Table 1
THE IMPACT OF UNANTICIPATED AND ANTICIPATED MONEY ON POST-ANNOUNCEMENT
INTEREST RATE CHANCES
—
c0+ c1(tM t.M) + c2(ME)+u
I 2 nt.r.st Bat. S1. P.rlod e0 c1 C2 c2 IL! B DVU
tr...ury $111. Oct.ll/79- Oct.1/I?0.0632.36* -29.51*-21.70'0.31 0.21 2.01 0.89
(U.S.) (0.03) (5.4$) (9.16)($39)
Oct. $112- J.n.27/$40.0111.14*-5.73 -2.100.11 0.3) 1.9$ 1.13
(0.01) (3.33) (3.10) (3.32)
Fib. 3/14-S.pt. 5/IS0.02 7.62. .6 70 •2.26 0.06 2.96 0.12
(0.01) (3.59) (3.95) (2.49)
Tr...urybill.Oct.11/79- Oct. 1/820.02 6.37' -4.63 -3.25 0.12 0.0$ 1.6$ 11.44
(Cenada) (0.01)(1.71) (3.20) (2.79)
Oct.$/$2.Jan.27/$60.01 4.33. -1.43 -0.71 0.06 0.09 1.67 2.7$
(0.01) (1.7$) (2.03) (1.7$)
Fib. 3/$4.S.pt. 5/130.01 3.73' -4.14* -1.19 0.05 0.0$ 2.13 6.95
(0.01) (1.74) (1 92) (1.21)
Cov.rint Bond, Oct.11/79-Oct.1/820.03* 11.63' •1S.$' .12.24' 0.1$ 0.17 2.06 0.32
(U.S.)
. (0.01)(2.53) (4.53) (3.96)
Oct. $/$2. J.n.27/$40.01 14.49* .1,99. .3.30 0.10 0.2$ 2.16 4.13
(0.01) (3.06) (3.47) (3.03)
Feb. 3/S4.S.pt. S/IS0.01 7.98' -6.61 -2.09 0.11 0.06 2.03 3.19
(0.01) (3.91) (4.30) (2.71)
Cev.rT.nt bond, Oct.11/79- Oct. 1/I? 0.05*9.94' -13.59' .12.31' 0.11 0.16 1.90 3.7?
(Cinada) (0.01) (2.53) (4.55) (3.96)
Oct. 1/12.J.n.27/$4000 11.93'.4.60 -2.62 0.10 0.1$ 1.10 3.46
(0.01) (3.24) (3.67)(321)
Fib. )/14.S.pt. 5/IS0.025.6 -6.13 -2.49 0.10 0.04 2.11 0.9$
(0.01)(3.46)(3.11)(2.40)
Notes: —log(M)
-log(M1)and M —log(M)- log(Ml' where M is themedianresponse to the honey Market Service, Inc.
survey. Asterisks denote significance at 5 per cent level.
Bracketed figures are'standard errors. BP is the Preusch-Pagan
statistic which tests for hetroskedasticity and is
asmptotically distributed x(2).c2* is the coefficient of
M when the survey median has been corrected for bias within
eacth subperiod. For the first and lastsubperiods, the standard
errors for Canadian Treasury bills are calculated according to
White (1980), due to significant BP-statistics. (See Zreusch and
Pagan (1979).) Second subperiod Canadian Treasury bill results
have been corrected for first-order serial correlation using the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure since originally the DW-statistic was
1.19.Table 2
TESTS OF THE UNBIASEDNESS OF THE MEDIAN RESPONSE TO THE
SURVEY OF MONEY MARKET SERVICES INC.
— O +
Sample Period SEE R2 DW
F-TEST
Oct.ll/79-Sept. 5/85 0.00041.2051* 0.00 0.40 2.00 5.41*
(0.0003)(0.0837)




0.01 0.29 1.95 1.95






0.00 0.68 2.28 8.42*
Notes: Asterisks denote significance at 5 per cent level. Bracketed
figures are standard errors. F-test (—0, — 1) is
distributed F(2, n-2).REFERENCES
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